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 The Demand for Health Care in South Africa 
  




Supply-side solutions to health-care provision dominate the South African debate 
about health care. These solutions are often premised on views that health resources 
are too concentrated in the private health sector – which supposedly serves only a 
small minority of the population – and thus public sector provision needs to be 
expanded. We argue that this rests on a lack of understanding of the nature of the 
demand for health services. This paper estimates the determinants of the demand for 
health care using a multinomial logit estimation. It is found that three categories of 
factors influence the demand for health care. Firstly, demographic and locational 
variables are significant (e.g. income group, race and where the respondent lives). 
Secondly, the characteristics of the care provided are important (e.g. cost and 
distance from the respondent). Finally, the characteristics of the illness (such as its 
severity) are important.  
 
Overall, private health care plays a surprisingly large role in the health care 
decisions of all South Africans – even poor respondents reveal  a clear preference for 
private health care, despite constraints of money and access. This dominance of the 
demand for private health care is likely to increase with rising incomes, or if all 
health services were to receive a similar subsidy (e.g. from mooted medical 
insurance-type schemes). On a policy level, this would indicate that greater attention 




   
  
I INTRODUCTION 
In the debate on how best to provide health care for all South Africans, the suggested 
solutions are often supply-side ones. It is widely accepted, for example, that more 
clinics are needed. The second issue in the debate is the role of the private sector. 
Policy proposals seem to be premised on the view that the private sector uses more 
than its share of available resources, whilst lack of income and health insurance leave 
the majority of the population dependent on state health care. This perceived problem 
is then the source of much debate about how to shift health resources towards the 
public sector in order to assist the poor.  
 
Such a perception, however, takes too little cognisance of the demand for health care. 
Our objective in this article is to analyse the factors that influence the demand pattern 
for health care in South Africa and to establish the reasons for this pattern. This is 
achieved by building an empirical health demand model using the 1993 South African 
Living Standards and Development Survey to contribute to a better understanding of 
the current health care system. To our knowledge no other study has yet attempted to 
empirically estimate the South African demand for health care services in this way. 
This study attempts to fill this void. It shows that: 
The demand for health care is indeed dominated by a demand for private health 




Public primary health care is clearly an inferior good, i.e. demand for the good 
decreases as income rises; 
If the cost of both public and private health care visits were to be reduced (e.g. 
through subsidies or other programmes) then there would be an even greater shift 
towards using private health care.  
 
These points have substantial implications for the debate about health care options 
and in particular for the role usually assigned to the public health system as the 
perceived provider of health care to the poor. 
 
   
 II LITERATURE REVIEW  
The nature of the demand for health and the Grossman model 
In an early paper on the nature of demand for health, Victor Fuchs was at pains to 
insist that ‘demand’ should be seen in terms of its economic definition: 
“When an economist talks about the demand for medical care, or any other good or 
service, he is talking about a willingness and ability to pay. The term should not be 
confused with ‘need’ or ‘want’ or ‘desire’, although these words are frequently used 
interchangeably with ‘demand’ by lay persons.” (Fuchs (1968), quoted in Cullis and 
West (1979: 75); our emphasis) 
 
Within a developing country context, it could be added that the demand for medical 
care is also influenced by access to health care.  
 
Demand for medical care is a derived demand. Consumers consume health care not as 
an end in itself but because they wish to be healthy. Also, as Grossman (1972a: 
footnote 4) notes, a consumer derives utility not only from health-giving pursuits (e.g. 
medical care). Economic agents thus do not necessarily want to maximise their health, 
but their overall utility, and they are often willing to let their health suffer to realise 
other goals (e.g. by smoking). 
 
In Michael Grossman’s (1972a and 1972b) seminal microeconomic papers on health 
demand he established the theoretical basis for a health demand function. The 
presentation here is a brief simplification of these papers and a later paper (Grossman 
1999), where he extends the model, answers criticism and presents three decades of 
development of the theory of health demand
2.  
 
The model proceeds from the following assumptions (Grossman 1999: 2): 
  Individuals are born with an initial capital ‘stock’ of health; 
  This stock diminishes with age (‘depreciates’); 
  The stock can be increased by investment in health; 
  Households are subject to a household production function; 
  Households attempt to maximise their utility given income and resource 
constraints; 
                                                 
2 A longer summary can be found in Mokan, Tekin  and Zax (2000). 
   
   Medical care is one of a number of inputs into a utility function and is subject 
to the same income and resource constraints as any other. 
 
Grossman’s model assumes that individuals assess the benefits from outlays that will 
improve their health and compare the benefits to those derived from expenditure on 
other goods or services in order to decide on their optimum health state. Consumers 
are assumed to have knowledge of their own health state, its rate of depreciation and 
the production function relating health improvements to health care expenditure. 
 
The inter-temporal utility function of a typical consumer is assumed to be: 
U = U(φ0H0 ,…., φnHn ; Z0,……Zn) 
with H0 the inherited stock of health, Hi the stock of health in period i, φi, the amount 
of health care consumed, hi = φi Hi  the total consumption of health services, and Zi 
total consumption of other commodities (excluding health). This inter-temporal utility 
function can be maximised to derive the expected behaviour of the rational consumer. 
Maximisation within a budget constraint leads the individual to equate the marginal 
return on the asset (health) with its marginal cost. The return to the j-th individual is 
made up of the marginal psychic return (aj) and the marginal monetary return (yj).
3 
The cost of health capital is the rate of interest forgone on other assets (rj) plus the 
rate of depreciation (δj). Thus,  
yj + aj = rj + δ 
 
Recent empirical studies 
The strong microeconomic basis to the Grossman model provided the point of 
departure for a series of health demand studies throughout the world. As statistical 
methodologies have developed, so the modelling techniques utilised have also altered. 





                                                 
3 In order to use the same unit of measurement for both, utility is measured here in money-metric 
terms. 
   
 TABLE 1: SELECTED EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
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The type of data used often determines methodological options. OLS is adequate for 
Grossman’s (1972a) application, which uses health care expenditure as the dependent 
variable. Heller (1982) uses two-stage least squares regression so as to include 
instrumental variables. But as expenditure is a particularly questionable dependent 
variable, particularly when care is highly subsidised or free, the binary response class 
of models (logits or probits) is arguably the most powerful for health demand 
modelling. They enable the researcher to model health care as a result of rational 
choices. Given that a given member of the population is sick, he or she makes a 
   
 rational decision to either seek treatment or not (Figure 1). Respondents who choose 
to seek care can effectively select from three options: primary care (usually a 
government clinic), private care (usually a general practitioner) or a hospital. The 
multinomial logit and probit approach allows the researcher to model different health 
choices. The probability of seeking health care according to various group 
characteristics (be they geographic, demographic, racial etc.) can then be estimated.  
FIGURE 1: THE HEALTH CARE DECISION IN A SEQUENTIAL CHOICE MODEL 
Well








Source: Adapted from Ichoku (2000: 24)     
 
The predominance of zero expenditures, due not only to free care, but also to the 
absence of illness or the lack of access, is elegantly sidestepped by a binary model 
rather than modelling actual expenditure. Also, another problem typically encountered 
– sample selection bias because samples usually are not random (respondents are 
already ill) – is reduced by such a model. Monte Carlo experimentation has shown 
that a two-part model such as the above performs somewhat better than a sample 
selection model variant, and that ordinary least squares regression will be subject to 
serious biases and large error variances (Hay et al. 1987).  
 
A best-case option would be to use panel data to model the health decisions of a set of 
households over time. This would allow both incorporating longer time spans and 
more options in modelling the effects of policy. However, regular health panel 
surveys are expensive and consequently scarce.
4 
                                                 
4 Ichoku (2000) personally obtained a relatively large sample in a small local government authority in 
Nigeria. His three-level nested logit model is particularly useful in that case, as detailed information 
had been obtained as to how households make their particular health care decisions. The nested logit 
allows empirical work to be done using a sequential choice structure and decisions to seek treatment 
   
  
Findings 
The empirical findings of the literature reviewed support Grossman’s (1972a) view 
that health care choice is a derived demand. Households see health care in the same 
light as other consumption items: it is consumed if it contributes more in net terms to 
the household’s overall welfare than the alternatives. The costs (including opportunity 
costs) of health care are thus offset against the benefits. 
 
Examples from the literature will demonstrate this point. Acton (1975) was one of the 
first researchers to point out the important role of non-monetary factors, such as the 
distance to the health facility and the time taken to receive treatment. Households are 
loath to consume health care if this consumption is time-consuming: the opportunity 
cost of that time is simply too high. This result is confirmed by Dor et al (1988) in the  
Côte d’Ivoire. In the absence of user fees, health care is rationed by distance to the 
care. 
 
The implementation of user fees is an important issue in health care provision. The 
literature finds health care surprisingly price inelastic. Heller (1982) argues that this 
indicates that user fees will not have significant welfare implications, but Gertler et al 
(1988) found in Peru that health care is more price elastic for poorer groups, thus 
rendering user fees regressive. This poses a peculiar dilemma, as the improvement in 
allocative efficiency and cost recovery that user fees bring is accompanied by 
redistribution of welfare from poorer to richer income groups  
 
III METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Methodology 
The empirical analysis is designed to model the health-care seeking behaviour of 
individuals who are ill. South African individuals have a number of choices – they 
can choose not to seek care, they can consult a traditional healer or a doctor, or they 
                                                                                                                                            
given illness can be evaluated according to the type of treatment and the sort of treatment sought. His 
model could, however, be criticised on the basis that it only takes into account health care decisions in 
the preceding month. In a decision-based model, this is a rather short time span to evaluate and draw 
conclusions on health-seeking behaviour. 
   
 can visit state-subsidised care in the form of a primary health care centre or a 
government hospital. Theoretically, the rational individual will choose that form of 
care that maximises his or her utility. After normalising for quality of care, at the 
margin the individual should be indifferent between health care providers.  
 
A multinomial logit model is used to empirically isolate those characteristics that 
determine which health care provider an individual will choose. The process can be 
seen as a simultaneous estimation of binary logits for all possible comparisons among 
outcomes, with estimates from binary logits providing consistent estimates of the 
multinomial parameters (Long 1997: 149). Formally, the multinomial logit model can 
be seen as a probability model, an odds model or a discrete choice model (Long 1997: 
152-6).  
 
Akin  et al (1995) maintain that there are significant reasons for choosing the 
multinomial probit rather than the logit. The major reason is that in the logit, the 
probability of one outcome relative to that of another is not changed by the addition of 
another option, known as the ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ or IIA. It 
implies that multinomial and conditional logit models can only be used when 
categories are “plausibly assumed to be distinct and weighed independently in the 
eyes of each decision maker” (McFadden 1973, quoted in Long 1997: 185). In the 
South African situation, self-treatment, public care and private care are indeed 
independent choices, thus this assumption holds and the multinomial logit can be 
used. 
 
The data set 
The data set used for the analysis is the South African Living Standards and 
Development Survey (LSDS) of 1993, initiated by the World Bank and carried out by 
SALDRU. The South African study fits with a number of studies conducted 
throughout the world, in an effort to have internationally comparable statistics on a 
number of socio-economic conditions (Deaton 1997). Of the 42  762 individual 
observations, 3 411 or 7.98% of respondents reported that they had been ill during the 
preceding 14 days. They were identified as the sub-sample of interest. After cleaning 
the data the size of the sub-sample used in the model was 3 166 respondents. The size 
   
 of this sub-sample compares favourably with that used in the studies quoted in Table 
1. Moreover, the advantage of a LSDS type data set is that respondents are ill at 
random (cf. Akin et al 1995 where data was taken from providers of care). Health 
specific surveys such as the 1998 South African Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) tend to concentrate heavily on health indicators and diseases, and often give 
only superficial treatment to socio-economic indicators (e.g. the DHS has no income 
question). Other Living Standards Measurement Studies have also been used in 
similar papers (Gertler et al 1988; Dor et al 1988).
5 
 
Properties of the sub-sample 
The sub-sample performs well in terms of underlying characteristics
6: 
  Race: 72% of respondents are black, 10% coloured, 5% Indian and 13% 
white, mirroring the demographics of the country.  
  Location: 50% of respondents are rural, 21% urban and 29% metropolitan; 
  Gender: The sub-sample performs less well in terms of gender, with a 
substantial majority of respondents being female (58%). This may be 
accounted for by the inclusion of pregnancy-related illnesses; 
  Age: the modal group is under fives, with 14% of respondents. Distribution is 
relatively equal across other age categories, tapering off for over 65s. 
The statistical design allows for weighting of individuals to ensure that the sample is 
representative of the underlying population. There is a good spread of reported 







                                                 
5 From a health perspective, three additional questions could have been posed: 
   What was your perception of the health care received? 
   Do you have any form of medical aid or medical insurance? 
  What was the cost of treatment, both excluding and including the contribution of your medical 
aid? 
In this paper, proxies are used for these issues, but clearly direct questions would have been better. 
6 Complete descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis can be found in 
Appendix A1. 
   


















































Respondents also provided information regarding the type of treatment they sought. 
There were eleven options, which we reclassified into four categories to simplify the 
analysis and because there is evidence that multinomial models are less accurate when 
the dependent variable has more than four categories (Breen 1996). The categorical 
variables created are summarised in Table 2. The majority of respondents chose 
private care (46%) (mainly a private doctor), followed by a public hospital (22%) and 





   
 TABLE 2: TREATMENT SOUGHT AND RECLASSIFICATION 
 








No treatment or other 
 
556 (17.6%) 









Health centre or clinic  441 (13.9%) 
Visit by primary care 
worker 
5 (0.2%) 
    Primary public 
care 
446 (14.6%) 
Pharmacy 36  (1.1%) 
Shop or supermarket  12 (0.4%) 
Private doctor  1 326 (41.9%) 
Traditional healer  68 (2.1%) 
Private nurse  3 (0.1%) 






1 464 (46.2%) 
Hospital 686  (22.0%)  Hospital  686 (22.0%) 
TOTAL  3 166 (100%)  TOTAL  3 166 (100%) 
 
This result is not unexpected, given that many of the ailments lend themselves to care 
by a private physician or one in public service (usually at a hospital). Palmer (1999) 
finds that these results are consistent with other surveys, with the 1995 October 
Household Survey, for example, reporting that 31.2% of ill respondents chose private 
care. However, she is critical of the fact that the survey shows that 326 respondents 
did not pay to see a private doctor (Palmer 1999), noting that it may be a result of a 
badly-formulated question, with respondents answering that they had seen a private 
doctor when actually they had seen the district surgeon. However, private doctors and 
district surgeons are perfectly substitutable
7, and this free doctor anomaly should not 







                                                 
7 They may even be the same person: the district surgeon is usually a private doctor who does 
additional work for the State. 
   
 IV EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical model assumes that choice of health care is a function of three broad 
groups of variables: characteristics of the respondent, characteristics of the care 
received and characteristics of the respondent’s illness. 
 
Overall statistical evaluation of the model 
The overall model can be statistically evaluated by considering whether the 
unrestricted model provides more information about the response variable than a 
restricted model with merely a constant term, or expressed differently: do the 
variables predict the underlying data generating process better than a model with only 
a constant? The F-statistic for the model is 126.01 and the probability that the 
variables are not significant less than 1%, confirming that indeed the model adds to 
our information.  
 
The model assigns most individuals to the correct group. It is particularly accurate in 
identifying those who decided to self-treat (99% correctly assigned) and those who 
chose some form of private care (87% correctly assigned), but less accurate in 
distinguishing between the two forms of state care, namely primary care and hospital 
care. If no distinction is drawn between primary health care and hospital care, the 
model has an accuracy of 73% for these two categories combined. It was, however, 
decided to retain this distinction, particularly in light of the government’s strong 
emphasis on primary care.  
TABLE 3: ACTUAL VS PREDICTED CHOICE 










Self treatment  563  1 6  0  570  99% 
Primary care  9  262  85 90  446  59% 
Private care  33  53  1 278  100  1464  87% 
Hospital 10  110  231  335 686  49% 
Total  615  426  1 600  525  3 166   
Pearson χ
2: 3955.95l; p = 0.00 
Interpretation: the rows indicate the actual choice made by each respondent in the survey. The columns indicate 
the choice that the model predicts, given the respondent’s characteristics. 
 
 
   
 Factors that were significant 
Independent variables behave differently across different health care choices. Other 
factors were important, such as how long the person had been ill and in which 
province he or she was resident. Thus the results can be interpreted in two ways: (a) 
was a factor significant, and if so, (b) how did it change the probability of a person 
seeking a certain type of care? Table 4 summarises the results for the first question. 
The discussion that follows the table answers the second. The Appendix A2 contains a 
summary table of the respective coefficients and standard errors. 
   
  
TABLE 4: WHAT INFLUENCES HEALTH CARE CHOICE? 
  Would the following factor have changed the respondent’s 







Household income  ***  –  ***  * 
Race ***  **  ***  *** 
Location:        
    Province  **  ***  –  * 
    Metropolitan    **  **  – 
    Homeland   *  *  *  – 
    Insured  *  –  –  – 
Factors related to care: 
Time to get there  N/A  ***  ***  *** 
Charge N/A  ***  ***  *** 
Time to get treatment  N/A  *  *  * 
Nature of illness: 
Length –  *  –  * 
Type:        
    Serious  –  –  –  * 
    Flu  *  **  *  *** 
    Tuberculosis  –  **  –  ** 
* Significant at the 10% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
– Not significant 
All variables are significant at the 5% level for the model as a whole. The Wald test was used throughout.  t-
statistics are reported in Appendix A2. 
 
Interpretation: 
 One can read across or down. Reading across and using “serious illness” as an example: we find that, all 
other things being equal, having a serious illness makes no difference to a respondent’s decision to self-
treat, seek primary care or seek private care. It is, however, a significant factor in the decision to seek 
hospital care. This is as expected. 
Reading down, one finds that the decision to self-treat is influenced by race, province, time to get to a 
facility, how much that facility charges, how long the respondent has been ill, and whether the illness is flu 
or not. 
 
1.  Characteristics of the respondent 
a. Income 
The a priori case for the inclusion of a measure of income is clear from the Grossman 
model. Most theoretical health demand models with a discrete dependent variable 
include income as an independent variable, as tastes and preferences may differ by 
income level (see for example Akin et al 1995). For historical reasons a priori 
   
 grounds to assume that the choice of health care differs by income level in South 
Africa. In this model, respondents were divided into five income quintiles. The results 
(see Figure 3) indicate a preference for private care as income increases, holding other 
things constant – as expected. Even the poorest fifth show a preference for private 
care. The poorest are also most likely not to seek any care at all. The demand for 
primary health care, unsurprisingly, falls off almost completely among the higher 
income groups. All these results are as expected. Primary health care is thus an 
inferior good: a rise in income is associated with decreased demand for the good. 
 















































Interpretation: A conditional probability plot graphically presents the results of a discrete
choice model such as the one used in this paper. Figure 3, for example, analyses the effect
of changing the income variable while keeping other variables constant at their means. This






   
 b. Race 
In the context of the highly fractured South African society, race plays a particularly 
important role in choice of health care. Dummy variables for the four race groups are 
thus included in the empirical specification. The model predicts differences in health 
care choice across race groups (Figure 4) and finds race to be a significant factor in 
deciding what type of care to seek, keeping all other factors constant. Thus there 
appears to be an enduring effect from the inequitable provision of health services 
during the apartheid era on present patterns of choice with regard to health care.  
 

































All other things being equal, it is clear that private care is the preferred alternative 
for all race groups. Preferences do, however, differ by race, with 79% of white South 
Africans preferring private care compared to 43% of black South Africans. The 
relevant Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that the decision to self-treat differs 
between black and white households.   
   
 c.  Locational dummy variables 
Three locational variables were included, viz. province, former homeland and a 
categorical variable for region-type (rural, urban or metropolitan).  The conditional 
probability plot in Figure 5 orders the nine provinces from the most likely to self-treat 







































Metropolitan residence should also influence health care choice – in particular since 
provincial hospitals and private facilities are usually located in metropolitan areas. 
The results show that there are no large differences in health care choice by location. 
The only exception is in rural areas, where more respondents choose primary care and 
fewer choose private care than in other areas.  
 
   



































Due to the inequitable provision of infrastructure under apartheid, there are a priori 
grounds for believing that former homeland status changes health-care seeking 
behaviour. The results confirm this. Respondents in former homeland areas are more 
likely to use primary health care and less likely to use private care (Figure 7). 
 


































Respondents with medical aid should be more likely to use privately provided care. 
Unfortunately, respondents were not asked whether or not they had medical aid. They 
were, however, asked the extent of any contributions to an insurance scheme. 
Assuming that most people who have insurance will also have a medical aid, a new 
dummy variable was created, reflecting whether or not the respondent had insurance. 
The results confirm that respondents with some form of insurance (1223, or almost 
39%, of the sample) are more likely to choose private care (see Figure 8) and 
consequently less likely to self-treat, seek primary care or utilise public hospitals.  
 


























2. Factors related to care 
a. Access 
The survey asks how long it took the respondent to get to a health facility. This is 
commonly used in health demand functions as a proxy for access to health care. There 
   
 are, however, problems of selection bias, which the literature does not address. 
Firstly, the question can only be asked of respondents who actually used health care. 
Secondly, the variable cannot be used to interpret how distance affects decisions, 
because there are no comparative figures. For example, we cannot say respondent A 
chose a primary health care facility over a hospital because of distance, because we do 
not know which one is nearer. The variable is, however, found to be statistically 
significant and is included merely as a proxy. 
b. Amount  charged 
It was found that the amount charged was statistically significant when entered as a 
categorical variable, but not significant when included as a continuous one. This is 
consistent with the theoretical view and empirical findings that health demand is 
reasonably price inelastic. The amounts charged are grouped into one of five 
categories, as shown in Table 5. 
 
TABLE 5: AMOUNT CHARGED 
Category Range  Frequency 
Free or did not pay  R 0  1 418 (41.6%) 
Nominal  R1 – R10  748 (21.9%) 
Average  R11 – R30  327 (9.6%) 
Above average  R31 – R100  694 (20.4%) 
Expensive R100+  224  (6.6%) 
    
 
c. Quality 
This is a particularly important determinant of health care choice. Unfortunately, it is 
also most difficult to quantify. The most sensible approach in the literature is that of 
Akin et al (1995), who construct a quality index based on questions posed to the 
respondents. Since this data is usually not available, the most popular proxy is time 
taken to get treatment. 
 
 
   
 3. Nature of the illness 
The type of illness should also affect health care demand. The theoretical approach 
argues that health care is sought because there are significant opportunity costs to 
being ill (Grossman 1972a). The longer a person is ill, the more he or she should be 
prepared to pay for health care. The number of days that the person had been ill in the 
preceding fortnight is thus also included as a dependent variable. Also the nature of 
the illness should affect the health care choice, particularly since primary health care 
facilities and hospitals are geared to treat different types of illness. Of the reported 
illnesses, only flu and tuberculosis affected health care choice individually. Figure 9 
reports the predicted probabilities for respondents with tuberculosis. In light of the 
strong correlation between HIV/AIDS and TB, this conditional probability plot is of 
particular interest. It finds that, all other things considered, TB sufferers are most 
likely to choose state hospitals above other types of care.  
 
































A number of serious illnesses were also significant as a group, these being kidney 
infections, strokes, cirrhosis of the liver, personal injuries, injury from violence and 
cancer. The conditional probability plot (Figure 10) finds that respondents with a 
   
 serious illness are very unlikely to choose primary health care (only 2%) but will most 
likely choose private care (50%) followed by state-provided hospital care (28%). 
































* Kidney infections, strokes, cirrhosis of the liver, personal injuries, injury from violence and cancer 
 
Factors that were not significant 
A number of variables initially introduced were later eliminated or re-specified so that 
only those found to be significant were retained. It is interesting to note those factors 
that did not change health choice significantly: 
  Age: this variable was included in a continuous form, a non-linear form and in age 
categories of 5 and 10 years. None were significant. 
  Gender: health choices do not differ significantly across gender. 
  Cost of medicine: in theory the cost of prescribed medicine is a function of illness 
and should not alter health choice. This was found to be the case. 
 
Why did respondents who self-treated choose not to visit a facility? 
Responding to a survey question, respondents who self-treated indicated that the 
prohibitive cost of medical care was the most dissuasive factor in choosing not to visit 
a facility, followed by no perceived need for health care (see Table 6). 
 
   
 TABLE 6: WHY WAS HEALTH CARE NOT SOUGHT?  
 Frequency Percentage 
Too expensive  192  33.7% 
No perceived need  224  39.3% 
Insufficient money for transport  66  11.6% 
Other 88  15.4% 
Total 570  100.00 
 
V POLICY QUESTIONS 
What would the effect be of lowering the cost of private care? 
The previous section established that private health care is a normal consumer good, 
i.e. higher levels of income translate to a greater use of the service. Primary care, 
though, is inferior, with higher levels of income likely to lead to lower use. The cost 
of care is also a significant determinant of what care is used. Making private care 
more affordable will improve the use of this type of care, freeing state resources. 
 
One proposal in discussions around a government-financed social health insurance 
was a subsidy scheme (Doherty et al. 2000), envisaged as a tax levied on all 
employed South Africans, who would then become part of a medical aid-type 
arrangement where the state effectively subsidises a part of the cost of seeing a private 
doctor. Whichever way the tax is raised, for purposes of analysis the simplifying 
assumption is made that the subsidy is available to all who chose health care in 1993
8. 
Alternatively, the cost of private care can be lowered by extending the reach of 
medical aid schemes. 
9 
 
                                                 
8 Hypothesising about a possible effect on those who were ill but who did not choose health care (i.e. 
self-treated) requires heroic assumptions regarding price elasticity, as there is no observed behaviour. It 
is, however, sufficient to mention that the average charge of a clinic was R21, a private provider R145 
and a hospital R89. It is likely that a R40 subsidy would be sufficient to cause a considerable 
movement from no care to a clinic. A large proportion of those who indicated that they found health 
care too expensive and therefore self-treated (Table 6) would presumably have shifted from self-
treatment to some sort of care, given such a subsidy. Totals in Table 7 correspond to the totals in Table 
3 excluding the respondents that were predicted to self-treat. 
9 This intervention could possibly, however, have serious distortionary effects on the market for private 
care and lead to negative second-round effects (see for example Bisseker 2001). 
   
 The model was used to simulate a decrease of R40 in the cost of care. This figure was 
used because it roughly corresponds to the contribution of an average medical aid to 
the cost of a visit to the doctor. The response matrix in Table 7 gives an indication of 
how South Africans would change their health-seeking behaviour. As can be seen, 
874 respondents, representing a full 35% of people who had chosen health care in the 
survey, move off the diagonal (i.e. to other health care options). The net effect of the 
subsidy is mainly to move people out of primary health care into private care. 




Predicted choice after subsidy  Total  % 
change 
  Primary Private  Hospital    
Primary  87  273 72  432  79.9% 
Private  66  1 187  157  1 410  15.8% 
Hospital  38 353  285 676  57.8% 
Total  191  1 813  514  2 518   
 
Table 8 summarises the net effect. The proportion of respondents choosing primary 
health care drops from 17.2% to 7.5%. There is a corresponding increase in the 
number of respondents choosing private care, with this proportion rising from 56.0% 
to 72.0%. The net effect on the choice of hospital care is a fall from 26.8% to 20.5%.  
 
TABLE 8: NET EFFECT OF R40 SUBSIDY 
Type of care  % of respondents who chose care* 
Chosen  without subsidy  with R40 subsidy 
Primary 17.2%  7.5% 
Private 56.0%  72.0% 
Hospital 26.8%  20.5% 
Total 100%  100% 
* excluding respondents who self-treated 
Why is private care preferred? 
a. Better resources 
Private health care is relatively better resourced than public health care. There are 
more doctors and pharmacists in private practice (Figure 11), for example. The level 
of resource allocation is also an important issue. Medical aid expenditure on health 
   
 care is approximately R35.5 billion compared to the public sector’s R27.2 billion 
(Bisseker 2001: 34).  















Source: Makin (1998) 
b.Better service delivery 
Palmer (1999) ran ten focus group discussions in five rural towns in the Western and 
Eastern Cape to analyse why people choose private services over public services. She 
identified four themes from the responses she received: 
•  Quality and choice come from paying for a service: Respondents felt paying for a 
service meant there was an incentive for good service delivery; 
•  Public sector care is not effective: Respondents felt the public sector did not 
provide effective care – a number of the respondents claimed that the nurses 
“merely prescribe pills”; 
•  Public sector care is not appropriate: The feeling was that public sector care 
(particularly clinics) is primarily for pregnant mothers, babies and tuberculosis 
sufferers; 
•  Poor attitudes from public sector staff: Many felt that public sector health workers 
(particularly nurses) treat patients badly, in marked contrast to the friendly attitude 
of private doctors.  
 
How active is the private sector? 
   
 It is often asserted that the private sector only provides for a small portion of the 
population (by implication high wage earners with access to medical aid). The figure 
most often used is 7 million people (e.g. in Bisseker 2001: 34). But in light of the 
evidence presented here, which is also supported by the October Household Surveys, 
this claim is rather doubtful. If nearly half of a large sample of ill South Africans –  
almost two-thirds of those who did seek treatment – used privately-provided health 
care, then it would appear that the private sector reaches far more people. 
 
In 1992/3 Valentine and McIntyre (quoted in Soderlund et al. 1998) estimated that 
approximately 22% of total health care spending was out-of-pocket in 1991. This adds 
an additional R17.3 billion to the amount spent on health care in South Africa in 
2000, assuming that the proportions have remained the same. The breakdown of how 
this money was spent is given in Table 9.  
TABLE 9: APPROXIMATE BREAKDOWN OF HEALTH SPENDING (2000) 
Spending by:     % Value 
State       34%  R 27.2 bn 
Medical aid      44%  R 35.5 bn 
Out-of-pocket
†      22%  R 17.3 bn 
consisting of:          
co-payments for medical aid  40%  R 6.9 bn     
cash to general practitioner  24 %  R 4.2 bn     
over the counter medicines  36 %  R 6.2 bn     
Total      100%  R 80 bn 
Sources: Soderlund, Schierhout and  Van den Heever (1998) and Bisseker (2001).  
† 1992/3 percentages 
 
TABLE 10: APPROXIMATE ANNUAL VALUE OF HOUSEHOLD HEALTH CARE SPENDING 
BASED ON PAST WEEK’S SPENDING OF RESPONDENTS IN 1993 SURVEY 
 Consultations Medication Total
Private health care    R 7.9 bn  R 1.7 bn  R9.6bn
Non-private health care   R 2.5 bn  R 0.2 bn  R2.7bn
Total   R 10.4 bn R 1.9 bn  R12.3bn
 
Note: 412 people (13% of sample) are charged nothing, but use private care. This is dealt with when 
discussing Palmer’s criticisms of LSDS. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may be as a result of 
employers paying for medical care of employees. 
 
From this it appears that the state’s share of overall spending on health care is 
approximately in line with its share of the use of health care services by respondents 
in this survey. Indeed, some medical aid and out of pocket spending are also paid to 
   
 state hospitals and clinics, thus contrary to the exaggerated claims to the contrary, the 
private sector may even get a smaller share of health spending resources than its share 
in health care provision, as judged from the survey data.  
VI CONCLUSION  
It was found that health care choices do differ significantly between South Africans, 
with the characteristics of the respondent (such as household income, race and 
location), factors related to the care received –  both monetary (the charge) and non-
monetary (e.g. time taken to get there) – and the nature of the illness all playing a role. 
 
For example, given that they are ill, 16 percent of the poorest income quintile of 
South Africans will not seek care. In the second poorest income quintile, four percent 
will not. This finding is consistent with the theoretical microeconomic demand for 
health function. Both monetary and opportunity costs (such as income foregone due to 
time spent obtaining care) are considered in the decision process. It is not sufficient to 
merely implement free care, but also care that  is quick and easy to obtain. 
 
For policy, an important finding is that the private sector plays an important role in 
the provision of health care. Public primary health care was found to be an inferior 
good, with private care substituted as income increases. Qualitative research 
elsewhere supports this finding and suggests that private health care is perceived as 
better than public health care.  
 
South Africa is particularly fortunate in that it has a well-developed private health 
sector. The nation’s public health resources are at present strained and even greater 
demands will be placed on it as a result of Aids. Encouraging the private sector to 
play a larger role among lower income groups will ease the government’s burden and 
allow it to spend more of its resources on that part of the health service which cannot, 
for reasons of access and equity, be left to the private sector.  
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 APPENDIX A: VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 




totminc   Total household monthly income  3 166 (100%)  2026  3187.5 
 Irace_2   Race dummy: Coloured  303 (9.6%)  -  - 
 Irace_3   Race dummy: Asian  162 (5.1%)  -  - 
 Irace_4   Race dummy: White  406 (12.8%)  -  - 
  (Black is the reference population group)  2 295 (72.5%)  -  - 
  prov_1   Provincial dummy: Western Cape  329 (10.3%)  -  - 
  prov_2   Provincial dummy: Northern Cape  34 (1.1%)  -  - 
  prov_3   Provincial dummy: Eastern Cape  508 (16.1%)  -  - 
  prov_4   Provincial dummy: Kwa-Zulu Natal  878 (27.7%)  -  - 
  prov_5   Provincial dummy: Free State  145 (4.6%)  -  - 
  prov_6   Provincial dummy: Mpumalanga  307 (9.7%)  -  - 
  prov_7   Provincial dummy: Limpopo  276 (8.7%)  -  - 
  prov_8   Provincial dummy: Northwest  171 (5.4%)  -  - 
  (Gauteng is the reference province)  518 (16.4%)  -  - 
Imetro_2   Location dummy: Urban  660 (20.1%)  -  - 
Imetro_3   Location dummy: Metropolitan  868 (27.4%)  -  - 
  (Rural is the reference location)  1 638 (51.7%)  -  - 
homeland   Location dummy: Former homeland area  1 637 (51.7%)  -  - 
 insured   Characteristic dummy: Respondent is 
insured 
1 223 (38.6%)   -  - 
time_get   Time taken to travel to treatment   3 166 (100%)  31.35  45.45 
Icharg_1   Cost of consultation: R  1 – R 10  748 (21.9%)  -  - 
Icharg_2   Cost of consultation: R11 – R 30  327 (9.6%)  -  - 
Icharg_3   Cost of consultation: R31 – R 100  694 (20.4%)  -  - 
Icharg_4   Cost of consultation: over R 100  224 (6.6%)  -  - 
  (Free is the reference cost)  1 418 (41.6%)     
Time_tre   Time waited for treatment  3 166 (100%)  33.65  55.84 
Days_sic   Days ill before seeking treatment  3 166 (100%)  7.81  5.02 
 Serious   Illness dummy: kidney infections, 
strokes, cirrhosis of the liver, personal 
injuries, injury from violence and cancer 
373 (11.8%)  -  - 
     flu   Illness dummy: influenza  701 (22.1%)  -  - 
      tb   Illness dummy: tuberculosis  82 (2.6%)  -  - 
   _cons  Constant       
 
 
   
 APPENDIX B: SURVEY MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION  
 
Survey multinomial logistic regression 
pweight:  rsweight                                Number of obs    =      3166 
Strata:   <one>                                   Number of strata =         1 
PSU:      clustnum                                Number of PSUs   =       349 
                                                  Population size  =   3032503 
                                                  F(  76,    273)  =    126.01 
                                                  Prob > F         =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  choice |      Coef.    Std. Err.       t     P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+----------
Primary health care 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 totminc |   .0000318    .0000824      0.386   0.700     -.0001302    .0001938 
 Irace_2 |   .3195917    .7291745      0.438   0.661     -1.114552    1.753735 
 Irace_3 |   2.162901    .7329454      2.951   0.003       .721341    3.604461 
 Irace_4 |  -.1091019    .6708909     -0.163   0.871     -1.428613    1.210409 
  prov_1 |  -1.923773    .6036514     -3.187   0.002     -3.111037   -.7365088 
  prov_2 |  -3.162251    1.167259     -2.709   0.007     -5.458021   -.8664812 
  prov_3 |  -2.579313    .6609163     -3.903   0.000     -3.879206    -1.27942 
  prov_4 |   -3.28099    .7394195     -4.437   0.000     -4.735283   -1.826697 
  prov_5 |  -.7323548    .6597919     -1.110   0.268     -2.030036    .5653266 
  prov_6 |   -2.93903    .7187796     -4.089   0.000     -4.352729   -1.525332 
  prov_7 |  -2.326638    .7586977     -3.067   0.002     -3.818847   -.8344281 
  prov_8 |  -1.860539    .7789317     -2.389   0.017     -3.392545   -.3285325 
Imetro_2 |  -.4696618    .4687111     -1.002   0.317     -1.391525    .4522012 
Imetro_3 |  -1.155141    .5955297     -1.940   0.053     -2.326431    .0161494 
homeland |   .8527691    .4930009      1.730   0.085     -.1168671    1.822405 
 insured |  -.3679269     .351943     -1.045   0.297      -1.06013     .324276 
time_get |   .2619023    .0991495      2.641   0.009      .0668946      .45691 
Icharg_1 |   6.099624    1.370662      4.450   0.000        3.4038    8.795449 
Icharg_2 |   22.19337           .          .       .             .           . 
Icharg_3 |   2.478251    1.301772      1.904   0.058     -.0820792    5.038581 
Icharg_4 |   21.46315           .          .       .             .           . 
time_tre |   .1465674    .0804639      1.822   0.069     -.0116893    .3048241 
days_sic |   .0436777    .0239887      1.821   0.070     -.0035033    .0908587 
 serious |  -.4389011    .3502684     -1.253   0.211      -1.12781    .2500082 
     flu |  -.7397411    .3438931     -2.151   0.032     -1.416111   -.0633707 
      tb |   1.265343    .6049559      2.092   0.037      .0755132    2.455173 
   _cons |  -1.695943    .6258221     -2.710   0.007     -2.926812   -.4650733 
---------+----------
Private health care 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 totminc |   .0001606    .0000528      3.041   0.003      .0000567    .0002644 
 Irace_2 |    .980477    .5501324      1.782   0.076     -.1015257     2.06248 
 Irace_3 |   2.235585    .6414869      3.485   0.001      .9739063    3.497265 
 Irace_4 |   .8069496    .4116763      1.960   0.051     -.0027371    1.616636 
  prov_1 |  -.3868376     .434523     -0.890   0.374     -1.241459    .4677839 
  prov_2 |  -1.940799     .958715     -2.024   0.044     -3.826404   -.0551944 
  prov_3 |  -.4527062    .5441157     -0.832   0.406     -1.522875    .6174628 
  prov_4 |  -1.263863    .6023788     -2.098   0.037     -2.448624    -.079102 
  prov_5 |  -.0331068    .4493069     -0.074   0.941     -.9168055     .850592 
  prov_6 |  -.7249424    .5996016     -1.209   0.227     -1.904241    .4543565 
  prov_7 |  -.8255314    .6102117     -1.353   0.177     -2.025698    .3746356 
  prov_8 |  -.1930066    .5977636     -0.323   0.747     -1.368691    .9826774 
Imetro_2 |  -.5286579    .4502251     -1.174   0.241     -1.414163    .3568468 
Imetro_3 |  -1.386958     .550621     -2.519   0.012     -2.469922   -.3039943 
homeland |  -.8304538     .429301     -1.934   0.054     -1.674805    .0138971 
 insured |   .4944132    .3060819      1.615   0.107       -.10759    1.096416 
time_get |   .2702539    .0990577      2.728   0.007      .0754267    .4650811 
Icharg_1 |    3.76506    1.384588      2.719   0.007      1.041847    6.488274 
Icharg_2 |   24.26865     .339824     71.415   0.000      23.60028    24.93702 
Icharg_3 |   5.537142    1.273329      4.349   0.000      3.032752    8.041531 
Icharg_4 |   23.56093     .704952     33.422   0.000      22.17443    24.94743 
time_tre |   .1413817    .0803246      1.760   0.079      -.016601    .2993644 
days_sic |   .0291586    .0189044      1.542   0.124     -.0080226    .0663398 
 serious |   .0700297    .2982789      0.235   0.815     -.5166264    .6566859 
     flu |  -.5609492    .3005112     -1.867   0.063     -1.151996    .0300975 
      tb |   .2976995    .4820817      0.618   0.537     -.6504609     1.24586 
   _cons |  -1.644065    .5254041     -3.129   0.002     -2.677432   -.6106985 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Tertiary health care 
   
  totminc |   .0001169    .0000653      1.790   0.074     -.0000115    .0002453 
 Irace_2 |   .9445371      .51586      1.831   0.068     -.0700586    1.959133 
 Irace_3 |   1.690007    .6504827      2.598   0.010      .4106351    2.969379 
 Irace_4 |  -.0309526    .4327976     -0.072   0.943     -.8821807    .8202756 
  prov_1 |   .0382521    .4866043      0.079   0.937     -.9188032    .9953074 
  prov_2 |  -1.920956    1.069957     -1.795   0.073     -4.025352    .1834394 
  prov_3 |    .573364    .5247449      1.093   0.275     -.4587065    1.605434 
  prov_4 |  -.3508304    .6248542     -0.561   0.575     -1.579796    .8781354 
  prov_5 |   .8363047    .5443289      1.536   0.125     -.2342837    1.906893 
  prov_6 |  -.0036275    .5778839     -0.006   0.995     -1.140212    1.132957 
  prov_7 |    .083644     .658872      0.127   0.899     -1.212228    1.379516 
  prov_8 |   .6984056    .6570957      1.063   0.289      -.593973    1.990784 
Imetro_2 |   .2385266    .4325026      0.552   0.582     -.6121213    1.089175 
Imetro_3 |   -.013643    .5266217     -0.026   0.979     -1.049405    1.022119 
homeland |  -.1246275    .4001743     -0.311   0.756     -.9116919    .6624369 
 insured |  -.0333569    .3238896     -0.103   0.918     -.6703842    .6036704 
time_get |   .2754088    .0991189      2.779   0.006      .0804613    .4703562 
Icharg_1 |   5.259554     1.37115      3.836   0.000       2.56277    7.956338 
Icharg_2 |    22.9623    .3690648     62.218   0.000      22.23642    23.68818 
Icharg_3 |   3.591568    1.296555      2.770   0.006      1.041499    6.141637 
Icharg_4 |   22.27877    .7698696     28.938   0.000      20.76458    23.79295 
time_tre |   .1482485    .0804538      1.843   0.066     -.0099883    .3064853 
days_sic |   .0847074    .0211917      3.997   0.000      .0430274    .1263874 
 serious |   .5975572    .3168761      1.886   0.060     -.0256761     1.22079 
     flu |  -1.896617    .3431188     -5.528   0.000     -2.571464    -1.22177 
      tb |   1.609502    .5097568      3.157   0.002      .6069103    2.612094 
   _cons |  -4.153791    .6014162     -6.907   0.000     -5.336658   -2.970923 
------------------------------------------------------
(Outcome choice == Self-treat is the comparison group) 
------------------------ 
 
i.race                Irace_1-4    (naturally coded; Irace_1 omitted) 
i.metro               Imetro_1-3   (naturally coded; Imetro_1 omitted) 
i.charged             Icharg_0-4   (naturally coded; Icharg_0 omitted) 
 
   
 